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ABSTRACT
Introduction Information technology (IT) plays a
pivotal role in improving patient safety, but can also
cause new problems for patient safety. This study
analyzed the nature and consequences of a large sample
of IT-related medication incidents, as reported by
healthcare professionals in community pharmacies and
hospitals.
Methods The medication incidents submitted to the
Dutch central medication incidents registration (CMR)
reporting system were analyzed from the perspective of
the healthcare professional with the Magrabi
classiﬁcation. During classiﬁcation new terms were
added, if necessary.
Main measures The principal source of the IT-related
problem, nature of error. Additional measures:
consequences of incidents, IT systems, phases of the
medication process.
Results From March 2010 to February 2011 the CMR
received 4161 incidents: 1643 (39.5%) from community
pharmacies and 2518 (60.5%) from hospitals. Eventually
one of six incidents (16.1%, n=668) were related to IT;
in community pharmacies more incidents (21.5%,
n=351) were related to IT than in hospitals (12.6%,
n=317). In community pharmacies 41.0% (n=150) of
the incidents were about choosing the wrong medicine.
Most of the erroneous exchanges were associated with
confusion of medicine names and poor design of
screens. In hospitals 55.3% (n=187) of incidents
concerned human–machine interaction-related input
during the use of computerized prescriber order entry.
These use problems were also a major problem in
pharmacy information systems outside the hospital.
Conclusions A large sample of incidents shows that
many of the incidents are related to IT, both in
community pharmacies and hospitals. The interaction
between human and machine plays a pivotal role in IT
incidents in both settings.
INTRODUCTION
In 2001 the Institute of Medicine Committee on
the Quality of Health System for the 21st Century
predicted that information technology (IT) would
play a pivotal role in improving patient safety.1 IT
can facilitate access to medical and medication
information, assist with calculations, perform
checks (in real time or afterwards), assist with mon-
itoring, and support communication between
healthcare professionals.2–5 In particular, the intro-
duction of computerized prescriber order entry
(CPOE) systems created high expectations for
enhancing patient safety in drug treatment. Not
surprisingly, early studies of the introduction of IT
in the healthcare sector focused only on the
beneﬁts of IT tools. For example, several studies
investigated the implementation of CPOE in hospi-
tals and its effects. Most of these studies showed a
decrease in prescribing error rates (ranging from
29% to 96%) after implementation of CPOE.6 It
was also found, however, that IT can cause new
problems for patient safety.6–10 An example of an
IT-related incident is the juxtaposition error in
CPOE. In a juxtaposition error CPOE users may
unintentionally select a wrong item or patient
because the items are close to each other on the
screen.11 Problems may also arise from the use of
other technology such as health information
systems, bar code scanning systems, automated dis-
pensing cabinets, printers, and infusion pumps.
To get an insight into such IT-related incidents an
instrument for measurement and analysis is needed.
In a qualitative and quantitative study in a hospital
Koppel et al12 divided the incidents into two
groups: human–machine interaction-related pro-
blems and information errors generated by fragmen-
tation of data. With interviews, focus groups,
shadowing and observations they identiﬁed 22 situa-
tions in which CPOE increased the probability of
prescribing errors. Magrabi et al13 proposed a classi-
ﬁcation of IT-related incidents based on an analysis
of patient safety incidents associated with computer
use. They analyzed 111 incidents from hospitals that
were derived from a voluntary reporting system in
Australia to explore the unintended consequences
related to IT. In a second study Magrabi et al14
expanded their original classiﬁcation after analyzing
436 IT manufacturer incidents, which had been sub-
mitted to the US Food and Drug Administration
manufacturer and user facility device experience
(MAUDE) database. Manufacturers in the USA are
required to report medical device malfunction to
MAUDE and manufacturers voluntarily report
IT-related incidents to MAUDE. The usefulness of
the resulting classiﬁcation across different healthcare
settings has yet to be tested. This study therefore
aimed at the analysis of the nature and consequences
of a large sample of IT-related medication incidents,
as reported by Dutch healthcare professionals in
community pharmacies and hospitals, using the
most recently adapted version of the classiﬁcation of
Magrabi et al.14
METHODS
Setting
In The Netherlands, there were 93 hospitals and
1997 community pharmacies in 2012.15 16
Hospitals and community pharmacies have a long
history of implementing IT tools and both have
started in 2006 and 2010, respectively, to report
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their medication incidents to a nationwide Dutch reporting
system: central medication incidents registration (CMR).17 18
The general picture is as follows, all hospital pharmacies and
community pharmacies now have a computer system for enter-
ing prescriptions. CPOE is not yet fully implemented in all hos-
pitals. In a recent study using questionnaires, CPOE was used or
was being implemented by 64 of the 72 responding hospitals. In
those hospitals 10 different CPOE systems were used.16 All
primary care physicians use CPOE and electronic medical
records. Despite the use of CPOE by primary care physicians
not all prescriptions can be transmitted electronically to the
pharmacy, because of a lack of system connectivity. Both hospi-
tals and community pharmacies have integrated clinical decision
support systems in their IT systems. The pharmacy staff gener-
ally use barcode scanning during dispensing. Compounding is
generally supported by electronic protocols and in process con-
trols (eg, checking of batch numbers, monitoring the correct
type and amount of ingredients with barcode scanning and
linked weighing balances).
Data source
For this study we used a subset of the reported medication inci-
dents that were sent by hospitals and community pharmacies to
the Dutch CMR database from March 2010 to February 2011.
These incidents had already been analyzed for a general study
about the CMR. The collection and analysis of the incidents is
exempt from medical ethical approval by Dutch clinical trial law
as it does not compromise the integrity of patients. All data
were handled according to the privacy legislation in The
Netherlands.18
Identiﬁcation of relevant incidents: development of a search tool
A string of search terms referring to ITwas developed for identi-
fying text fragments in the free text description. An initial set of
terms was derived from the literature and adapted on the basis
of the experiences of members of the research team (KCC, PDS)
with the weekly screening of incidents to the CMR.18 This
initial set of terms was applied to a set of 100 incidents that had
been randomly selected from the database. The same set of 100
incidents was also analyzed manually by researcher KCC. The
researcher read the free text description and decided for each
report whether the incident was related to IT (see supplemen-
tary appendix A, available online only, for the chapters and
items on the CMR reporting form). Both selections (after apply-
ing the set of search terms and after manual analysis) were com-
pared, on the basis of which set of terms was adapted.
Eventually this process was iterated ﬁve times until no new
terms emerged. To check this set of terms, a second researcher
(WVN) followed the same iterative method and if necessary the
set of terms was expanded with new terms. Researcher WVN
applied the set of terms once to a different set of 100 incidents
and manually checked these for comparison. The ﬁnal set of
search terms consisted of unique 121 items and some words
were repeated in misspellings or in a part of the word (see sup-
plementary appendix B, available online only, for the list of 121
search terms).
Identiﬁcation of relevant incidents: application of the search tool
The ﬁnal set of search terms was applied to the CMR incidents
that had been reported in the period of March 2010 up to
February 2011. The incidents thus identiﬁed were independ-
ently reviewed by two researchers (KCC and WVN). They
selected incidents if they perceived that technology had
somehow contributed to the incident. The resulting incidents
were subsequently divided into three groups:
▸ both researchers assessed that the incident was suitable for
inclusion
▸ both researchers assessed that the incident was not suitable
for inclusion (exclusion)
▸ one or both researchers had doubts about the suitability of
the incident.
The latter category of incidents was reviewed by a third
researcher (PDS) to make a ﬁnal decision on inclusion or
exclusion.
After reviewing duplicate incidents were removed (seven inci-
dents from community pharmacies and one incident from hospi-
tals). During analysis our insight into IT incidents deepened and
eventually we removed six incidents because they had been mis-
takenly selected initially (one incident from a community phar-
macy and ﬁve incidents from hospitals).
Classiﬁcation of relevant incidents
The two researchers (KCC, WVN) analyzed and classiﬁed 200
incidents together to become accustomed with the analyzing
method and with the axes of the most recent Magrabi classiﬁca-
tion, which was published in 2012.14 The remaining incidents
were then independently analyzed and classiﬁed by the two
researchers. They subsequently came together to compare their
results and to reach consensus on the classiﬁcation of the inci-
dents. If an incident described more than one IT-related inci-
dent, the researchers classiﬁed all the problems separately. For
the incidents that were independently analyzed, the percentages
of agreement were calculated. The percentages of agreement
were calculated for the two axes (the principal source of the
IT-related problem and the nature of the error) and the add-
itional category IT system and phases of the medication process.
Within the incidents from community pharmacies the percen-
tages of agreement ranged from 85.8% to 93.3% and within
hospital incidents ranged from 52.7% to 80.0%. For both the
community pharmacies and the hospitals the percentages of
agreement were lowest for the axis of the nature of the error.
This classiﬁcation consists of two axes: the principal source of
the IT-related problem (‘machine-related error’ or ‘human–
machine interaction-related error’) and the nature of the error
(problem). Magrabi et al14 subdivide the latter axis (the nature
of the error) into incidents related to input (data entry), to
output (data retrieval), and to transfer (transfer of data between
systems). In addition, Magrabi et al14 had two separate items in
the classiﬁcation that were not linked to input, transfer or
output (contributing factors and general technical). The contrib-
uting factors were not strictly related to IT and we did not ﬁnd
examples in our analysis. The general technical terms were rear-
ranged during our classiﬁcation and linked to input, transfers or
output. In total the Magrabi classiﬁcation consists of 32 pre-
ferred terms; for example, wrong input, (machine) not alerted,
data loss, etc. During classiﬁcation of the CMR incidents new
preferred terms were added, if the Magrabi classiﬁcation could
not cover the incident adequately. For the axis ‘nature of the
error’, the two researchers maintained the subdivisions input,
transfer and output. The preferred term ‘wrong input’ was ela-
borated by adding nine new preferred subterms: wrong patient;
wrong medicine; wrong dose; wrong duration of therapy;
wrong time of administration; wrong pump speed; wrong pre-
scriber; duplicate input; and other wrong input. An extra sub-
division of ﬁve preferred terms for wrong medicine was
considered necessary to classify the incidents in sufﬁcient detail.
For the preferred term ‘not done’ two new preferred subterms
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were added. The researchers also added ﬁve new preferred
terms in the subdivision output (data retrieval) and two new
terms in the subdivision transfer (data of transfer) (see table 1
and ﬁgure 1).
After categorizing the IT incidents using the Magrabi classiﬁ-
cation as described above, further characterization of the inci-
dents was performed by designating the IT-related problem to
the IT system involved (table 2) and the speciﬁc phase of the
medication process into which the medication incident had
occurred (table 3). Information about the consequences of the
incidents was collected directly from the incident report forms
(see supplementary appendix A, available online only, for the
chapters and items on the CMR reporting form).
RESULTS
Identiﬁcation of relevant incidents
In the period of March 2010 up to February 2011, the CMR
received 4161 incidents. Healthcare providers working in com-
munity pharmacies submitted 1643 (39.5%) incidents and those
in hospitals submitted 2518 (60.5%) incidents. The set of
IT-related search terms yielded 624 incidents from community
pharmacies and 877 incidents from hospitals. After reviewing
by two researchers (KCC, WVN), 16.1% (668/4161) of all
CMR incidents were somehow related to technology. In the
batch of incidents from the community pharmacies, 21.5%
(351/1636) of the incidents were related to technology and in
the batch from the hospitals this percentage was 12.6% (317/
2517). The researchers (KCC, WVN) extracted 365 problems
from the 351 community pharmacy incidents and 338 problems
from the 317 hospital incidents (see supplementary appendix C,
available online only, for the ﬂow chart of this process).
Consequences of incidents
Community pharmacies reported 167 (47.6%) incidents, which
had reached the patient. Most of these incidents (82.0%,
n=137) were harmless to the patient; 12.0% (n=20) of inci-
dents caused minimal harm, 2.4% (n=4) caused serious tempor-
ary harm, and for six (3.6%) incidents the outcome for the
patient remained unknown. In the hospitals 193 (60.9%) inci-
dents reached the patient; 46.6% (n=90) of these 193 incidents
were harmless to the patient, 23.8% (n=46) of incidents caused
minimal harm, 8.3% (n=16) of incidents caused serious tem-
porary harm, two (1.0%) incidents were associated with the
death of a patient, and for 20.2% (n=39) of the incidents the
outcome was unknown.
Classiﬁcation of relevant incidents
Table 4 shows a combination of two axes, ie, the principal
source of the IT-related problem and the nature of the error
(only subdivided as input, transfer and output). Most of the
incidents were classiﬁed as human–machine interaction-related
incidents.
In the community pharmacies 92.9% (n=339) of all the inci-
dents concerned interactions between humans and the IT
system. Table 4 shows that most problems (79.7%, n=291) were
classiﬁed as human–machine interaction-related input (data
entry). A relatively common problem was a healthcare provider
choosing the wrong patient when entering the prescription into
the pharmacy computer system.
Fewer problems (85.8%, n=290) reported from hospitals
belonged to an interaction between a human and a machine.
Within this group data entry (input) was the most classiﬁed
problem and 16.6% (n=56) of the incidents were classiﬁed as
human–machine interaction-related output. Most of these inci-
dents were about unclear printouts.
Nature of the errors
The axis of the nature of the errors ultimately comprised 28
preferred terms (see table 1 and ﬁgure 1).
In community pharmacies 41.0% (n=150) of the incidents
were about choosing the wrong medicine. Most of the errone-
ous exchanges were caused by confusion of medicine names and
poor design of screens. The second most frequent problem was
choosing the wrong patient. In community pharmacies incidents
related to output (data retrieval) were not common.
A quarter (25.1%, n=85) of the incidents in hospitals dealt
with healthcare providers who did not enter (‘not done by
human’) data in the systems (eg, CPOE). It was not always clear
why the physicians did not enter the prescription(s) into the
CPOE. The incidents classiﬁed to ‘output unclear’ concerned
problems with printouts of medication lists for administration.
The machine-related output incidents in hospitals were about
printers with technical malfunction so that nurses could not
print out medicine lists any more.
IT system
The IT system category consisted of 12 different IT systems (see
Table 2). Most IT systems were used in hospitals and community
pharmacies, but some IT systems (infusion pumps) were only
mentioned in the incidents from hospitals. Sometimes systems
were linked to each other, for example, a printer connected to a
computer with a software program (CPOE or pharmacy infor-
mation system). In the hospital the CPOE was generally linked
to the pharmacy information system so that physicians, pharma-
cists and nurses could use the same system for prescribing, dis-
pensing and administration. In the community pharmacies, the
pharmacy information system and the pharmacy bar code scan-
ning system were linked to each other. Clinical decision support
systems are always incorporated in CPOE systems or pharmacy
computer systems. In this study we classiﬁed all incidents con-
cerning clinical decision support as CPOE or pharmacy informa-
tion system.
In community pharmacies 74.0% (n=270) of the incidents
were related to the pharmacy information system and concerned
human–machine interaction-related input. Other incidents with
the pharmacy information systems were related to human–
machine interaction-related output (9.9%, n=36) and
machine-related output (3.6%, n=13). In the machine-related
output a pharmacy information system gave incorrect and con-
fusing advice to the pharmacy assistant.
In hospitals the CPOE was the most frequently implicated IT
system and 55.3% (n=187) of the incidents concerned human–
machine interaction-related input in combination with CPOE;
9.2% (n=31) of the incidents concerned CPOE and human–
machine interaction-related output. One example was a
large-scale malfunction of the CPOE, during which physicians
and nurses could not reach the system any more. Physicians and
nurses could not prescribe or administer. Incidents with phar-
macy information systems were not so common but when they
occurred most of them concerned human–machine interaction-
related input (5.6%, n=19).
Phases of the medication process
Table 3 shows the classiﬁcation of problems into the different
phases of the medication process.
In community pharmacies 88.2% (n=322) of the incidents
occurred during the entering of prescriptions into the pharmacy
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Table 1 Nature of the error
Problems in
community
pharmacies
N (%)
Problems in
hospitals
N (%) Examples of incidents in community pharmacies and hospitals
Data entry and record manipulation
No input
Not done*
Not done by human* 9 (2.5) 85 (25.1) ▸ The pharmacist received an e-mail with a prescription; due to an unknown reason the
pharmacist assistant did not enter the prescription into the system. (CP)
▸ After the ward round the physician forgot to enter the prescriptions into the CPOE. (H)
▸ The physician was not familiar with CPOE and could not order the medicine with the CPOE.
(H)
Not possible to import
record†
– 8 (2.4) ▸ Rifampicin was not listed in the CPOE. The consequence was that the physician could not
order rifampicin in the CPOE. (H)
Not possible to change
predefined record†
– 2 (0.6) ▸ The physician could not change the infusion rate of a predefined antibiotic order in the
CPOE. (H)
Wrong input*
Wrong medicine†
Wrong identity medicine† 49 (13.4) 12 (3.6) ▸ The pharmacist assistant entered ‘CHLOO25’ in the system and accidentally chose
chlortalidone 25 mg instead of chlordiazepoxide 25 mg on the screen. (CP)
Wrong dosage form† 26 (7.1) 6 (1.8) ▸ An erroneous exchange between immediate release tablet and slow release tablet. The
pharmacist assistant chose the wrong medicine from the list, which was presented by the
pharmacy information system. (CP)
Wrong route of
administration†
1 (0.3) 1 (0.3) ▸ For eye drops the right eye was entered in the pharmacy information system instead of the
left eye. (CP)
Wrong strength of product† 72 (19.7) 17 (5.0) ▸ The pharmacy dispensed sifrol 3.75 mg instead of 0.375 mg. (CP)
Selected medicine not
available†
2 (0.5) – ▸ The general practitioners repeated a prescription and the original identification record was
canceled. In the community pharmacy this repeat record cannot be recognized by the
pharmacy information system. (CP)
Wrong patient† 54 (14.8) 18 (5.3) ▸ Pharmacist assistant used date of birth to find a patient in the system. After entering the
date of birth a list of patient names with the same day of birth was shown on the screen. A
wrong patient was selected due to a poor design of screens. (CP)
▸ At the ward there were two patients with the same family name. The physician selected the
wrong patient on the screen of the CPOE and entered a prescription for the wrong patient.
(H)
▸ The physician entered a prescription into CPOE for a one-day-old newborn. During
dispensing the pharmacist assistant noticed the birth day and called the ward. During the
call they discovered the medicine should have been prescribed to the mother. (H)
Wrong dose/frequency† 47 (12.9) 23 (6.8) ▸ A pharmacist duplicated a record in the system and accidentally repeated an outdated dose
in this process. (CP)
Wrong duration of therapy/
quantity of the medicine†
13 (3.6) 3 (0.9) ▸ The pharmacist assistant entered 10 tablets of ondansetron 8 mg instead of 30 tablets of
ondansetron. (CP)
Wrong time of administration† 2 (0.5) 23 (6.8) ▸ A wrong time of administration was entered into the CPOE. The patient needed the
medicine around 12 : 00 h and the time of administration in the CPOE was 14 : 00 h. (H)
Wrong infusion pump rate† – 21 (6.2) ▸ The rate of an infusion pump was accidentally set wrongly. Due to the low infusion pump
rate the patient received only half of the dose. (H)
Wrong prescriber† 5 (1.4) 1 (0.3) ▸ The pharmacist assistant entered the wrong code of the prescriber into the pharmacy
information system. (CP)
Duplicate input† 8 (2.2) 10 (3.0) ▸ The pharmacist assistant entered the prescription two times in the pharmacy information
system. (CP)
▸ The physician entered the same medicine twice into the CPOE. (H)
Other wrong input† 6 (1.6) 12 (3.6) ▸ The physician entered diclofenac into the CPOE for a patient for whom diclofenac was
contraindicated. (H)
Failure to communicate after
input*
– 5 (1.5) ▸ The physician entered the medication order into the CPOE but he forgot to brief the nurses
about the new medication. (H)
Data retrieval
No output
System slow/down* – 14 (4.1) ▸ Physicians and nurses could not reach the CPOE because there was a large-scale IT
malfunction. (H)
▸ The nurse did not administer the antibiotic because the printer was down and she could not
print out the administration list. (H)
Not done by human
(did not look)*
14 (3.8) 11 (3.3) ▸ The pharmacist assistant did not look into the notes of the patient file and missed the
information that the patient needed a home delivery of the medicine. (CP)
▸ Nurses did not realize the physician had entered a note in the electronic patient file and
thereby missed the administration of an antibiotic. (H)
Continued
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information system. Obviously all incidents in this phase were
related to the pharmacy information systems.
In hospitals 66.6% (n=225) of the incidents occurred during
the prescribing process, the second place was taken by the
administration phase (24.3%, n=82). In the prescribing phase
the CPOE had a prominent position (63.6% (n=215) of all inci-
dents). The CPOE also played a role in the administration phase
(10.1% (n=34) of all incidents). Most of these latter incidents
related to the printing of medication lists, for example, physi-
cians forgot to print the list after entering prescriptions into the
CPOE. Incidents in the transcription phase, patient monitoring
phase and storages and logistics were hardly reported from hos-
pitals and community pharmacies.
DISCUSSION
This is the ﬁrst study on the nature and frequency of medication
incidents related to IT in a large sample of IT-related incidents
reported by healthcare providers in community pharmacies and
hospitals. We found that one of six reported incidents (16.1%,
n=668) were related to IT and that more incidents were related
to IT in the community pharmacies (21.5%, n=351) than in
hospitals (12.6%, n=317). As far as we know, this is also the
ﬁrst study analyzing medication incidents related to all kinds of
IT systems, thereby showing the pivotal role of CPOE and phar-
macy information systems in medication incidents.
Within the Magrabi classiﬁcation we expanded the ‘input’
group with a subdivision to make the incidents more speciﬁc
and concrete. Magrabi et al14 primarily chose an IT perspective,
which seems especially important for IT professionals who
develop healthcare-related IT systems. Our angle was guided by
the proposal of Sittig and Singh19 to deﬁne IT incidents not
only from the technical viewpoint of manufacturers, developers,
and vendors but also from the social technical viewpoint of end
users. The underlying principle is that healthcare providers wish
to learn about IT-related risks by considering when and what
they can do wrong with what type of IT system. We analyzed
Table 1 Continued
Problems in
community
pharmacies
N (%)
Problems in
hospitals
N (%) Examples of incidents in community pharmacies and hospitals
Not alerted/no output* 9 (2.5) 7 (2.1) ▸ A cardiologist accidentally prescribed a high dose of flecainide for a patient in primary care
and the pharmacy computer system did not alert the community pharmacist about it. There
was no alert because formally it was not an overdose, but according to the cardiologist the
dose was too high for the patient in primary care. There should have been an alert. (CP)
Wrong output
Output error* 5 (1.4) 9 (2.7) ▸ The infusion pump alerted the nurses too late about an obstruction in the tube. (H)
Unclear output
Different output online and
printed†
1 (0.3) 2 (0.6) ▸ In the CPOE the nurse read that the aspirin needed to be administered with a high loading
dose, but on the paper medication list the information about the high loading dose was
missing. (H)
Differences between two files† – 3 (0.9) ▸ In the CPOE the nurse read from the medication list that the patient needed tolbutamid. In
a separate memo field in the CPOE the nurse read that tolbutamid should not be
administered to the patient. (H)
Other unclear output† 6 (1.6) 35 (10.4) ▸ A community pharmacist printed out a medication list for a patient going to hospital. The
printout was unclear and the consequence was that a physician in the hospital
misinterpreted this medication list. He thought the patient only used 50 mg losartan per day
instead of 2 times 50 mg. (CP)
▸ A nurse administered 5 times more bisoprolol than prescribed. On the medication list she
read that the patient needed bisoprolol and on the list the number 5 was printed without
unit (mg or tablet). Eventually she administered 5 tablets of isoprolol 5 mg to the patient.
(H)
▸ The nurse missed a new prescription order because the printer had printed out all the
orders at once with the new prescriptions at the bottom of the pile of paper (even after
orders that had already been stopped). (H)
Failure to react on signal† 29 (7.4) 5 (1.5) ▸ Due to alert fatigue a pharmacist assistant overruled the signal from the pharmacy barcode
scanning system that the wrong medicine had been chosen. (CP)
▸ The general practitioner ignored a drug–drug interaction signal. (CP)
▸ The infusion pump made an alarm sound. The nurse could not identify the problem and
eventually switched off the alarm of the infusion pump. (H)
▸ A pharmacist assistant did not respond correctly to alerts of the pharmaceutical clinical
decision support system, such as allergy warnings or drug–drug interaction warnings. For
example, an order for a cephalosporin was executed despite an alert for an allergy. (H)
Other output† 2 (0.5) 1 (0.3) ▸ For dispensing the pharmacist assistant printed out a list, which was not up to date
anymore. (H)
Data transfer
Mistranslation of data between
2 systems†
4 (1.1) – ▸ An incomplete transfer of an e-prescription between the computers of the general
practitioner and the community pharmacist. The information of the brand of the medicine
was missing. (CP)
No data transfer between
2 systems†
3 (0.8) 4 (1.2) ▸ A physician could not use the CPOE because of a technical malfunction in the connection
between the CPOE and the medical record system in the hospital. (H)
*This preferred term was also available in the Magrabi classification.
†This preferred term is new.
CP, community pharmacies; CPOE, computerized physician order entry; H, hospitals.
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the incidents from a healthcare provider’s perspective and we
combined it with the technical items. Eventually, we related the
technical items to input or output problems. Magrabi et al14
also had ‘contributing factors’, which consisted of organizational
or individual causes of incidents. We were focussed on the
nature of the incident and we did not use these items.
Interestingly, our study showed that the input problems occur-
ring with CPOE also occurred with pharmacy information
systems outside the hospital. Most studies that we found were
about the impact of CPOE and there were no studies about the
impact of pharmacy information systems.6–10 Despite the use of
CPOE in primary care many of the community pharmacists still
need to enter the prescriptions manually into their pharmacy
information systems. One of the reasons is that generally not all
prescriptions can be electronically transmitted from the CPOE
system to the pharmacy information system.
Although frequencies have to be interpreted carefully in this
study, it is interesting to compare our results with those of other
studies. In their ﬁrst study, Magrabi et al13 identiﬁed 111
incidents from a database with 42 616 incidents (0.3%, n=111)
and in the second study 678 incidents were selected from a
database with 899 768 incidents (0.1%, n=678).14 ITwas much
more frequently involved in our sample of incidents. One
reason may be that the latter consisted entirely of medication
incidents. Another contributory factor could be the long history
of implementing IT tools in Dutch healthcare. Since the 1970s,
community pharmacists have applied IT in their daily practice
(followed later by primary care physicians).17 In hospitals the
shift from a paper-based to a computerized system began
10 years later.
In the ﬁrst study of Magrabi et al,13 45% (n=53) of the inci-
dents were human–machine interaction-related problems.13 In
their second study this number was lower and only 4% (n=30)
were human–machine interaction-related problems.14 The
MAUDE database contains incidents from manufacturers in the
USA and probably these incidents were more focussed on pure
IT aspects (only machine-related problems), such as software
problems. In contrast, our study showed that a majority of the
incidents were human–machine interaction related. Healthcare
providers reported directly to CMR and although it may be dif-
ﬁcult for them to identify the underlying technical causes of
IT-related incidents, they can readily recognize the nature
Figure 1 Adapted diagram of Magrabi et al14 2012 classiﬁcation and added terms from central medication incidents registration incidents.
Table 2 Overview of IT systems involved
IT systems
Involved in the problems in
Community pharmacies
N (%)
Hospitals
N (%)
Automated dispensing cabinets 2 (0.5) –
Computerized physician order entry 21 (5.8) 250 (74.0)
Order system website* 1 (0.3) –
Electronic health record – 21 (6.2)
Fax – 1 (0.3)
Infusion pump – 27 (8.0)
Laboratory diagnostic analyser† – 1 (0.3)
Medication administration registration – 5 (1.5)
Pharmacy bar code scanning system 13 (3.6) –
Pharmacy information system 326 (89.3) 28 (8.3)
Prescription scanner‡ 1 (0.3) –
Printer 1 (0.3) 5 (1.5)
*Website used by pharmacies to purchase medicine.
†Automatic devices used by diagnostic laboratories to analyze blood, urine, etc.
‡Community pharmacies scan the prescriptions after dispensing to digitally archive
the prescriptions.
Table 3 IT problems in the different phases of the medication
process
Phase in medication process Problems in
community
pharmacies
N (%)
Problems in
hospitals
N (%)
Prescribing 23 (6.3) 225 (66.6)
Transcription – 2 (0.6)
Entering of prescriptions into the
pharmacy information system*
322 (88.2) 22 (6.5)
Compounding – –
Dispensing 16 (4.4) 4 (1.2)
Administration – 82 (24.3)
Patient monitoring – 3 (0.9)
Storage and logistics 4 (1.1) –
*This is including pharmaceutical clinical decision support.
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and clinical consequences of such incidents. The predominance
of incidents concerning data entry and record manipulation
(input) is in line with the results of Magrabi et al,13 who classi-
ﬁed 31% (n=36) of the incidents as information input pro-
blems. A USA national voluntary medication error-reporting
database showed comparable CPOE input problems. Half of the
incidents involved dosing errors such as wrong doses.20 Zhan
et al20 concluded that CPOE-related medication errors are not
only caused by faulty computer interfaces but also by common
use errors such as typing errors. Most studies about CPOE have
shown comparable input problems.6 8 12 21–23
Our low proportion of transfer problems was in contrast with
Magrabi et al,13 who classiﬁed 20% (n=23) of all incidents as
transfer problems in their ﬁrst study. Magrabi et al13 classiﬁed
incidents related to computer network, systems integration
issues and inaccessibility of systems, from as little as 15 min to
as long as 8 h, as information transfer problems. In their second
study, however, only a small proportion of problems (2%,
n=13) was related to transfer of information.14 With the health-
care provider’s perspective we focused on how the problems
affected the work processes, and eventually incidents were clas-
siﬁed as input or output problems. This could explain our low
proportion of transfer problems. We only assigned two types of
transfer problems: ‘mistranslation of data’ and ‘no data transfer’.
These kinds of problems were also mentioned in a literature
study about the transferring and displaying of pathology data in
electronic health records.24
Strengths and limitations
The main strengths of this study were the comparison between
the different healthcare settings and the high number of inci-
dents, as well as the use of a classiﬁcation system that is in accord-
ance with the healthcare provider’s perspective. This study
proved that one classiﬁcation could be used for both settings.
For this study we analyzed a large number (668) of incidents
from community pharmacies and hospitals. Lewis25 states in an
article about post-marketing surveillance that the number of
studied drug users must be three times as high as the frequency
of an adverse drug reaction to have a 95% chance that the reac-
tion will actually occur in the study population. For instance,
300 subjects have to be studied to have 95% conﬁdence to
detect an adverse drug reaction with an incidence of one in
100.26 This means that the number of analyzed incidents in our
study was more than sufﬁcient to get an insight into the most
frequent unintended consequences associated with IT incidents.
Despite the rigorous validation process a potential limitation
of this study is that the adapted classiﬁcation was only applied
to one set of incidents. A logical next step would be its
validation in a new set of data. Another limitation was the vari-
able quality of the descriptions of the incidents. Not all the inci-
dents were described well and some of them hardly contained
enough information for further analysis. To minimize the risk
that the researcher would infer some details of the incident that
were not actually reported, the two researchers analyzed the
incidents independently and met afterwards to reach consensus.
A third limitation was the difﬁculty to classify the incidents in
the axis of the nature of the error. The IT systems were easier to
classify because they were more concrete.
Last but not least, the incidents came from a voluntary report-
ing system and it could be possible that healthcare providers pri-
marily focused on incidents that they considered important or
out of the ordinary. Especially after the introduction of a new
IT system healthcare providers might focus more on the use of
this new IT system.27 On the other hand, incidents that were
not recognized by healthcare providers will thereby have
remained unreported. So the real number of unintended conse-
quences with IT could also be higher.
Implications for practice
Considering the percentage of incidents related to IT, it is neces-
sary to pay attention to this new ﬁeld of incidents in healthcare.
IT was introduced with the idea of preventing incidents and
healthcare providers may trust IT too much in supporting their
daily practice. This study helps healthcare providers to become
more aware of the unintended consequences related to IT.
Our study identiﬁed all kinds of IT problems and healthcare
workers need to be aware that such problems can occur.
Healthcare providers must know how to intercept or respond to
these IT incidents to prevent patient harm. Interceptions may be
performed from the human perspective (eg, training of indivi-
duals) or from the technical/organizational perspective (eg,
system design and workﬂow changes). In general, the latter are
preferred because they form a system solution instead of an
individual solution.28
This study suggests a few interceptions. An accessible back-up
of patient records is required when a large-scale malfunction of
the CPOE prevents physicians and nurses from reaching the
regular system. When printers are not able to print any more
nurses should be aware that they have to access patient informa-
tion by other means. The input problems that were caused by
poor design of screens need to be discussed with the software
vendors. The implementation of complex CPOE or any IT
system should be accompanied by adequate training in the use
and possibilities of such IT systems. Healthcare organizations
should consider the relevant work processes when installing a
new IT system. The problem ‘not done by human’ could some-
times be related to the introduction of a new IT system, which
does not ﬁt well into an existing work process. Finally, the clas-
siﬁcation system used in this study may help to increase the
information value of incidents.
Implications for research
Future research should be carried out in collaboration with
users, vendors and incident-analysis experts to get a more inten-
sive insight into IT-related incidents. The classiﬁcation of
Magrabi et al14 was useful after we had added some preferred
terms, but for more information about the incidents we believe
that subsequent analysis of underlying causes, harm to the
patient and which healthcare profession was involved, might be
helpful. This should be the subject of further study and the ﬁnal
classiﬁcation system should be validated using different sets of
incidents.
Table 4 Principal source of IT-related problem and nature of the
error
Problems in community
pharmacies
N (%)
Problems in
hospitals
N (%)
Human–machine
interaction-related input
291 (79.7) 234 (69.2)
Human–machine
interaction-related output
48 (13.2) 56 (16.6)
Machine-related input 3 (0.8) 15 (4.4)
Machine-related output 16 (4.4) 29 (8.6)
Machine-related transfer 7 (1.9) 4 (1.2)
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Technology is changing fast and every day new IT system can
be introduced that will entail their own unintended conse-
quences. The introduction of new IT system should be accom-
panied by prospective risk analysis.16 Research on the
performance and effect of such risk analyses is necessary.
Information transfer problems are an important new area for
research. At this moment these problems are not yet common
but more and more computers will be linked to each other.
Thus a malfunction in one setting can rapidly spread to other
departments or healthcare organizations.29 30
This study was focussed on the determination of IT-related
incidents and compared these in community pharmacies and
hospitals. Some interceptions were suggested to prevent reoccur-
rence of the incidents. Research is needed to investigate the
interceptions on human perspectives and technical/organization
perspectives. Probably a combination of both sorts of intercep-
tion is necessary to prevent IT-related incidents.
CONCLUSION
This is the ﬁrst study that shows how many of the incidents in the
CMR database are related to IT in both community pharmacies
and hospitals. The interaction between human and machine plays
a pivotal role in the IT incidents. In community pharmacies the
pharmacy information system was most frequently involved
while in hospitals the CPOE was most frequently involved. The
classiﬁcation of Magrabi et al14 was a very useful starting point
but we added some new preferred terms during analysis. In sub-
sequent analysis we introduced the IT system category in this
study and phases of the medication process. The slightly adapted
Magrabi classiﬁcation will help healthcare providers in picturing
the incidents, as these axes help to put the incidents in the
context of healthcare practice. This classiﬁcation system seems
useful for reporting and analyzing IT incidents in healthcare in
general, but further research will have to prove this.
Contributors For this manuscript all authors have substantially contributed to the
conception and design, or analysis and interpretation of data, drafting the article or
revising it critically for important intellectual content and ﬁnal approval of the
version to be published.
Funding None.
Competing interests None.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
Data sharing statement Data are available on request. Please send an e-mail to
the corresponding author: k.c.cheung@knmp.nl
REFERENCES
1 Institute of Medicine, Committee on Quality of Health Care in America. Crossing the
quality chasm a new health system for the 21st century. Washington, DC: National
Academy Press, 2001.
2 Bates DW. Using information technology to reduce rates of medication errors in
hospitals. BMJ 2000;320:788–91.
3 Bates DW, Gawande AA. Improving safety with information technology. N Engl J
Med 2003;348:2526–34.
4 van Doormaal JE, van den Bemt PM, Zaal RJ, et al. The inﬂuence that electronic
prescribing has on medication errors and preventable adverse drug events: an
interrupted time-series study. J Am Med Inform Assoc 2009;16:816–25.
5 Chaudhry B, Wang J, Wu S, et al. Systematic review: impact of health information
technology on quality, efﬁciency, and costs of medical care. Ann Intern Med
2006;144:742–52.
6 Reckmann MH, Westbrook JI, Koh Y, et al. Does computerized provider order entry
reduce prescribing errors for hospital inpatients? A systematic review. J Am Med
Inform Assoc 2009;16:613–23.
7 Ash JS, Berg M, Coiera E. Some unintended consequences of information
technology in health care: the nature of patient care information system-related
errors. J Am Med Inform Assoc 2004;11:104–12.
8 Khajouei R, Jaspers MW. The impact of CPOE medication systems’ design aspects
on usability, workﬂow and medication orders: a systematic review. Methods Inf Med
2010;49:3–19.
9 Niazkhani Z, Pirnejad H, Berg M, et al. The impact of computerized provider order
entry systems on inpatient clinical workﬂow: a literature review. J Am Med Inform
Assoc 2009;16:539–49.
10 Weiner JP, Kfuri T, Chan K, et al. “e-Iatrogenesis”: the most critical unintended
consequence of CPOE and other HIT. J Am Med Inform Assoc 2007;14:387–8.
11 Ash JS, Sittig DF, Dykstra RH, et al. Categorizing the unintended sociotechnical
consequences of computerized provider order entry. Int J Med Inform 2007;76
(Suppl. 1):S21–7.
12 Koppel R, Metlay JP, Cohen A, et al. Role of computerized physician order entry
systems in facilitating medication errors. JAMA 2005;293:1197–203.
13 Magrabi F, Ong MS, Runciman W, et al. An analysis of computer-related patient
safety incidents to inform the development of a classiﬁcation. J Am Med Inform
Assoc 2010;17:663–70.
14 Magrabi F, Ong MS, Runciman W, et al. Using FDA reports to inform a
classiﬁcation for health information technology safety problems. J Am Med Inform
Assoc 2012;19:45–53.
15 Foundation for Pharmaceutical Statistics. Facts and Figures 2012. On
pharmaceutical care in The Netherlands. The Hague: Foundation for Pharmaceutical
Statistics, 2012.
16 van der Veen W, de Gier HJ, van der Schaaf T, et al. Risk analysis and user
satisfaction after implementation of computerized physician order entry in Dutch
hospitals. Int J Clin Pharm 2013;35:195–201.
17 van Mil JW, Tromp DF, McElnay JC, et al. Development of pharmaceutical care in
The Netherlands: pharmacy’s contemporary focus on the patient. J Am Pharm Assoc
(Wash) 1999;39:395–401.
18 Cheung KC, van den Bemt PM, Bouvy ML, et al. A nationwide medication incidents
reporting system in The Netherlands. J Am Med Inform Assoc 2011;18:799–804.
19 Sittig DF, Singh H. Deﬁning health information technology-related errors: new
developments since to err is human. Arch Intern Med 2011;171:1281–4.
20 Zhan C, Hicks RW, Blanchette CM, et al. Potential beneﬁts and problems with
computerized prescriber order entry: analysis of a voluntary medication
error-reporting database. Am J Health Syst Pharm 2006;63:353–8.
21 Westbrook JI, Reckmann M, Li L, et al. Effects of two commercial electronic
prescribing systems on prescribing error rates in hospital in-patients: a before and
after study. PLoS Med 2012;9:e1001164.
22 Wetterneck TB, Walker JM, Blosky MA, et al. Factors contributing to an increase in
duplicate medication order errors after CPOE implementation. J Am Med Inform
Assoc 2011;18:774–82.
23 Campbell EM, Sittig DF, Ash JS, et al. Types of unintended consequences related to
computerized provider order entry. J Am Med Inform Assoc 2006;13:547–56.
24 Hamblin JF, Bwitit PT, Moriarty HT. Pathology results in the electronic health record.
Electron J Health Inform 2010;5:e15.
25 Lewis JA. Post-marketing surveillance: how many patients? Trends Pharmacol Sci
1981;2:93–4.
26 Loonen AJM. Klinisch veligheidsonderzoek van geneesmiddelen: methoden en
instrumenten. Pharm Weekbl 1989;124:1025–31.
27 Weant KA, Cook AM, Armitstead JA. Medication-error reporting and pharmacy
resident experience during implementation of computerized prescriber order entry.
Am J Health Syst Pharm 2007;64:526–30.
28 Reason J. Human error: models and management. BMJ 2000;320:768–70.
29 Perrow C. Normal accidents: living with high-risk technologies. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1999.
30 Sittig DF, Singh H. Electronic health records and national patient-safety goals.
N Engl J Med 2012;367:1854–60.
e70 Cheung K-C, et al. J Am Med Inform Assoc 2014;21:e63–e70. doi:10.1136/amiajnl-2013-001818
Research and applications
 by guest on February 8, 2016
http://jamia.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
